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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
Administrative agencies function within statutorily defined parame-
ters. While within these bounds, an agency may perform any or all of
the three governmental functions. Given the immense power and perva-
siveness of administrative agencies, it is important for practitioner, pro-
fessor and student to understand the workings of and limitations upon
these bodies. Judicial review is the most direct means to check unau-
thorized agency action. As such, the opinions of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals provide an excellent guide for understanding the lim-
itatons placed upon this "fourth branch" of government. Generally, re-
viewing courts show great deference to agency decisions-be they
adjudicatory or rulemaking. The Tenth Circuit during the last survey
period has, with few exceptions, followed this trend of deference.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
A. Interpretation of Federal Legislation
1. Mayoral v. Jeffco American Baptist Residences, Inc.
Traditionally, reviewing courts are ultimately responsible for con-
struing federal statutes.' Administrative applications of statutory terms,
however, will be granted persuasive weight if reasonable. 2 This rule was
illustrated in Mayoral v. Jeffco American Baptist Residences, Inc. 3 in which the
1. See the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), (C) (1982) (directing
reviewing courts to decide questions of law and to interpret statutory provisions). See also
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (ultimate responsibility for construction of Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, making unfair methods of competition unlawful, rests with
courts); IRS v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 717 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1983) (courts are
the final authority on issues of statutory construction); Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d
807 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (courts have primary responsibility over questions of statutory inter-
pretation); Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 581 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (statu-
tory interpretation is a question of law which, as a general rule, is freely reviewable); Gaibis
v. Werner Continental, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (construction of statutory
terms is a legal question for the court to decide); Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D.
Fla. 1976) (courts have the ultimate responsibility to determine issues of statutory inter-
pretation); Bryant v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 407 F. Supp. 360 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (construction of a statute is a matter of law to be resolved by the court); Young v.
AAA Realty Co. of Greensboro. inc., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (the judiciar'y is
ultimate authority on issues of statutory interpretation).
2. Rarely does a term of the Supreme Court expire without a reaffirmation of this
principle. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977); United
States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Train v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973);
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Investment Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1 (1965); Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas and Fuel Assoc's v. United States, 377
U.S. 235 (1964); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
3. 726 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 255 (1984).
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Tenth Circuit decided whether "mandatory meal charges are rent under
the United States Housing Act and whether HUD [Housing and Urban
Development] can permit the charges under that Act."
'4
In Mayoral, the defendant, Jeffco, operated an apartment complex in
Lakewood, Colorado which housed elderly, low-income tenants. The
tenants required only minimum support services. The apartment com-
plex included a cafeteria, but every apartment had its own kitchen. In
order to prevent the dining facility from closing, the Jeffco operators
imposed a mandatory meal program on the tenants. 5 The program in-
cluded 24 meals a month for sixty dollars.
6
HUD approved the Jeffco meal plan pursuant to HUD regulations
7
and the residents were given notice and an opportunity to comment on
the plan.8 WhenJeffco instituted the plan, the tenants sought to enjoin
it. 9
The district court, perJudge Kane, permanently enjoinedJeffco and
HUD from imposing the mandatory meal charges unless such charges
were treated as "rent" under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.10 By so doing, Judge
Kane ensured that any mandatory meal charge imposed on the tenants
would be subjected to the same seventy to eighty-five percent subsidy
applicable to the tenants' rent." In reaching this decision, Judge Kane
reasoned:
Just like any other mandatory charge, the meal ticket charge is
one that a tenant must. . . shoulder if she is to continue to live
in the complex. All mandatory charges must therefore be con-
sidered. rent. It is defendants' choice whether or not to furnish
and charge for such services, but if they decide to make the
charges mandatory, they must be included in "rent" under
§ 1437f. To hold otherwise would circumvent Congress's in-
tent in enacting § 1437f to leave low income families with 70-
85% of their incomes to spend or save as they deem best.'
2
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Jeffco mandatory meal
plan as approved by HUD fell within the authority granted by the Na-
4. Id. at 1363. The United States Housing Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701-1750
(1982). Rent subsidies are provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982).
5. Id. at 1362-63.
6. Id. at 1363.
7. Id. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.607(d) (1984).
8. 726 F.2d at 1363.
9. Id. at 1362.
10. Mayoral v. Jeffco Am. Baptist Residences, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1981).
11. Id. at 703-04. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f the Secretary of HUD and the project
owner enter into an assistance contract which specifies the share of rent to be paid by each
tenant. The amount paid by each qualified tenant cannot exceed 15-30% of the tenant's
income. HUD subsidizes the amount of rent owed to the project owner that the tenant
does not pay. Id. at 702.
12. Mayoral, 519 F. Supp. at 703-4. See S. REP. No. 392, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1524, 1542, which states: "One of the
purposes of this section is to permit improved operating and maintenance services in pub-
lic housing projects while still permitting occupancy by very low-income tenants. The Sec-
retary would be expected, however, . . . to insure that excessive operating costs, and consequently
higher rentals, are not incurred." (emphasis added).
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tional Housing Act. 13 In reaching its decision the court relied on three
factors. First, the court made clear that it would show deference to
HUD's interpretation of the United States Housing Act. 14 Although
HUD had approved the meal plan, it argued against including the cost of
mandatory meal plans under the Act's definition of rent. 15 Second, the
court relied on an unpublished Ohio district court opinion for the prop-
osition that, under the United States Housing Act, a mandatory charge
for meals does not constitute rent. 16 Third, finding that section 8 of the
Act contains no controlling definition of rent, the court purported to
"interpret the word in accordance with its ordinary meaning."' 17 The
court concluded that "[a] mandatory meal program does not violate the
purpose of Section 8,"18 rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the meal
charge contravenes the purpose of section 8, as stated in the Act's decla-
ration of policy.19
Given that the United States Housing Act fails to provide an appro-
priate definition of "rent," it is understandable that the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court; however, in so doing the Tenth Circuit may
have deferred too quickly to the agency's position. 20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion can be challenged on at least two grounds.
First, the court's reliance on the plain meaning of the word "rent" is
suspect. The court was content to state simply: "Meal charges do not
fall within the commonly understood concept of rent. Rent is income
that an owner of land receives from a tenant for the use or occupation of
land."
2 '
In Mayoral, the meal program was mandatory; the tenants were re-
quired to purchase the meal program as a condition of occupancy.
Given the mandatory nature of this charge, one can persuasively argue
13. Mayoral, 726 F.2d at 1366.
14. Id. at 1363 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
15. HUD was a defendant in the action.
16. 726 F.2d at 1363-64. See Chambers v. Toledo Jewish Home for the Aged, Inc.,
No. C 80-575 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 1980) (held that a mandatory meal charge is not rent
under 42 U.S.C. § 14370.
17. 726 F.2d at 1365 (citing S. REP. No. 392, 91 st Cong., I st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1524, 1542, which states: -[T]he 'rental' for such unit
would be the proportional share of the total shelter costs to be borne by the low-income
tenants .. ")
18. 726 F.2d at 1366.
19. Id. at 1365.
20. The Supreme Court recently held that reviewing courts should not rubberstamp
administrative decisions which are inconsistent with a statutory mandate or which frustrate
the underlying Congressional policy. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977) (ad-
ministrative interpretations of statutory terms are given important, but not controlling,
significance); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (agency interpretations of federal stat-
utes must be consistent with the congressional purpose); Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v.
Montana, 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) (deference accorded administrative interpreta-
tions of statutes is not absolute); Banda v. Office of Personnel Management, Dept. of Air
Force, 727 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1984) (deference to agency construction of federal statutes is
not required where compelling indications exist suggesting that agency interpretation is in
error); Public Ser. Co. of Colo. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983) (administrative
interpretations of statutes are entitled to deference, not obeisance).
21. 726 F.2d at 1364 (emphases added) (citing Peterson v. Oklahoma City Housing
Auth. 545 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1976)).
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that the income Jeffco received from the plan was in fact income re-
ceived "for the use or occupation of land." Jeffco received sixty dollars
per month, per tenant, regardless of whether the tenant actually ate any
of the 24 cafeteria meals. Failure to pay the charge would violate the
lease; hence, the tenants did not necessarily pay for food so much as
they paid for the right to remain in occupancy. Indeed, in this case, it is
a very short step from an "ordinary" definition of rent to a definition
that reasonably includes the cost of meals as a condition of occupancy.
22
Second, and perhaps most important, the Tenth Circuit never ad-
dressed an important equitable consideration raised by the district
court. 23 On one hand, a decision to enjoin the plan would cause Jeffco
some lost profits. On the other, by excluding the mandatory meal
charge from the definiton of rent, the elderly low-income tenants would
be forced to pay sixty dollars a month for meals they might never eat.
The Tenth Circuit implicitly gave greater weight to the owner's lost
profits than to the tenants' lost income-and loss of choice. The district
court, however, reasoned differently:
Because plaintiffs are all aged people on whom the uncer-
tainty and added burden of suing for damages would take a
great toll, I hold that injunctive relief is proper here. Further,
this case is not limited to purely financial matters. The quintes-
sential issue is whether these tenants can be deprived of their
freedom to choose. Admittedly, the tenants are free to leave,
but it must likewise be admitted that the defendants have
availed themselves of federal funding which must be used in
furtherance of the clear congressional policy to subsidize the
freedom of choice and diginity of life for these aged people.
Thus, I hold that there is no adequate remedy at law which can
compensate these tenants for the daily loss of that freedom to
choose which, according to their own poignant testimony, is a
matter of the utmost concern to each of them. It is that very
loss of choice which is irremediable.
24
2. Brandon v. Pierce
Another HUD interpretation of federal legislation was upheld in
Brandon v. Pierce.2 5 This case involved an Urban Development Action
Grant (UDAG) to expand a city-owned sewage treatment facility onto
property owned by plaintiffs. The Brandons sought injunctive and de-
claratory relief in a suit against the Secretary of HUD.2 6 The complaint
alleged that HUD had violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) 2 7 and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
22. The court's reliance on the Senate Report for the proposition that "rent is gener-
ally payment for shelter" (see infra note 17) is refuted by this same reasoning.
23. See 519 F. Supp. at 704 n.6.
24. Id.
25. 725 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1984.)
26. The city of Stilwell, Oklahoma was a co-defendant.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
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(HCDA)2 8 by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) prior to approving the UDAG for the City of Stilwell, Oklahoma.
The Tenth Circuit held the HUD regulations, which did not require
an independent environmental review by HUD of a UDAG prior to ac-
ceptance of the application and release of funds thereunder, were a valid
implementation of the agency's authority under NEPA. 2 9 The court
based its conclusion on legislative history which emphasized congres-
sional intent to transfer NEPA responsibilities from the federal agency
to the local grant applicant.3 0 Because the HUD environmental regula-
tions satisfied this legislative purpose, the regulations were sustained.
3. Matzke v. Block
In Matzke v. Block,3' the Tenth Circuit displayed a distinct lack of
deference to what it considered administrative "construction of the stat-
ute by silence."'3 2 The statute in question concerned the Farm and Ru-
ral Development Act.33 Under this Act, payment and principal due on
loans made by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), could be de-
ferred by the Secretary upon request.3 4 More important, under the
same statute, the Secretary was permitted to forego foreclosure of any
such loan.
3 5
Plaintiffs, the class of farmers living in Kansas who had received
loans from the FmHA, sued to force the Secretary to promulgate rules
under which the Secretary could defer payment and forego foreclosure
on FmHA loans. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the Secretary had
"taken no action to place in operation or implement the remedies pro-
vided for them" by section 1981a of the Act.
36
As a defense, the Secretary argued that the promulgation of regula-
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
29. 725 F.2d at 563-64. In regard to other issues raised by the Brandons on appeal,
the court held: (1) Stilwell complied with HUD's procedural requirements; therefore,
HUD's approval of the UDAG was not arbitrary and capricious, id. at 561; (2) Stilwell's
decision not to prepare an EIS was reasonable "in light of the mandatory requirements
and high standards set by NEPA," id. at 563 (citation omitted); and (3) Stilwell's environ-
mental assessment was not invalid because the private engineering firm hired to prepare
the assessment depended on HUD's favorable action on the UDAG grant application to
obtain its fee, id. at 563-64.
30. Id. at 559-61. See CONF. REP. No. 1279, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4449-4500. The Housing and Community Development Act of
1974 specifically authorized the assumption by grant applicants of environmental review
responsibilities for compliance with NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h) (1982). In addition, 1979
amendments to the HCDA added clarifying language which guaranteed that grant appli-
cants could assume other environmental responsibilities. See CONF. REP. No. 706, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2402-04; see also H. REP.
No. 154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CON6. & AD. NEWS 2317,
2323.
31. 732 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 800.
33. Id. See 7 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1982).
34. As a condition of the loan, the FmHA took interests in the farmers homes, crops,
livestock and equipment. 732 F.2d at 800.
35. 7 U.S.C. § 1981a (1982). See infra note 38.
36. 732 F.2d at 800.
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tions was discretionary under the Act and that other existing legislation
provided adequate remedies; therefore, further regulations were
unnecessary.
3 7
The Tenth Circuit resolved the case by construing the word "may"
as used in the enabling statute. The statute provided that the Secretary
"may permit . . . the deferral of principal and interest . . . and may
forego the foreclosure of any such loan..."38 Based on this language,
the Secretary argued that development of the program was discretion-
ary. The farmers maintained that while the Secretary retained discretion
to deny requests for deferrals or to forego foreclosure, development of
rules and procedures was mandatory.
3 9
The Tenth Circuit, relying upon the repeatedly stated legislative
policy of fostering, encouraging and maintaining the family farm,40 held
that the Secretary was required to develop a section 1981a deferral pro-
gram.4 1 Moreover, the court went on to require that the Secretary use
the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
42
Unlike the Mayoral decision discussed above, 43 the Tenth Circuit in
Matzke determined that language of the statute and the underlying pur-
pose thereof took precedence over administrative convenience. Also, it
is interesting to note that, unlike Mayoral, the Tenth Circuit felt free to
grant relief to the class of Kansas farmers even though the opinion does
not state exactly how the farmers were aggrieved.
B. Interpretation of Agency Regulations
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial re-
versal of administrative legal conclusions "found to be ... an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'44 Generally,
37. Id. at 801.
38. 7 U.S.C. § 1981a states in pertinent part:
In addition to any other authority that the Secretary may have to defer princi-
pal and interest and forego foreclosure, the Secretary may permit at the request of
the borrower, the deferral of principal and interest on any outstanding loan
made, insured, or held by the Secretary under this chapter, or under the provi-
sions of any other law administered by the Farmers Home Administration, and
may forego foreclosure of any such loan, for such period as the Secretary deems
necessary upon a showing by the borrower that due to circumstances beyond the
borrower's control, the borrower is temporarily unable to continue making pay-
ments of such principal and interest when due without unduly impairing the stan-
dard of living of the borrower.
(emphasis added).
39. 732 F.2d at 801-02.
40. Id. at 801 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2266(a) (1982) and 7 U.S.C. § 1921 (1982)).
41. 732 F.2d at 803.
42. Id. at 802. The Administrative Procedure Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1982).
43. See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). This section of the APA restates the common law
rule that administrative officers vested with discretion possess a limited authority to exer-
cise such discretion reasonably. If an abuse of discretion occurs, judicial intervention is
appropriate, and the issue becomes whether the challenged act falls within a "zone of
reasonableness" allowed agencies upon review. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283,
307 (1974). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (even broad delegations of
administrative authority contain an implied condition of reasonable exercise).
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courts need not defer to administrative decisions on questions of law". 4 5
However, an exception arises when the agency interprets and applies its
own regulations. 4 6 During the survey period the Tenth Circuit upheld
two such agency decisions scrutinized under the "abuse of discretion"
test.4 7 In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Independent Mills, Inc. ,48 however,
the court overruled an administrative interpretation of an Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) tariff.
The case involved the application of rail tariffs to wheat shipments.
Plaintiff, a common carrier of freight, contended that certain rate in-
crease tables applied to the defendant, Independent Mills. 49 Both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit refused to defer to an agency inter-
pretation which was ambiguous on its face. 50 Rather, the courts focused
on earlier affirmative acts by both the ICC and the Southern Freight
Tariff Bureau which indicated an intent to exclude wheat shipments
from rate increases. 5 ' The lack of deference in this case can be ex-
plained by the absence of clear and consistent agency action upon which
deference could be founded.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
A. Review of Informal Rulemaking
Judicial review of informal administrative rulemaking usually em-
ploys a "rational relationship" test: the regulations are upheld when
rationally related to a proper government interest.5 2 This test was ap-
plied to uphold contested regulations in Wyoming Hospital Association v.
Harris. 53 The Association 54 sought declaratory and injunctive relief rel-
45. See supra note 1.
46. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190 (10th Cir. 1980) (reviewing
court must look to the administrative construction given to the meaning of the language
used in the regulation, as such interpretation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation).
47. Sotelo v. Hadden, 721 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1983) (involving deference to the U.S.
Parole Commission's interpretation and application of parole guidelines); Hughes v. Watt,
No. 82-1583 (10th Cir. July 10, 1983) (Department of Interior regulations as to reopening
of estate matters involving Native Americans).
48. 706 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1082.
50. Id. at 1082-3. The Tenth Circuit stated that the district court "acted properly in
intervening and vacating an ICC tariff construction where, as here, the tariff was ambigu-
ous on its face. This condition is especially subject to court review where the interpreta-
tion by the ICC is at odds with the interpretation intended by the drafters of the tariff." Id.
at 1083.
51. 706 F.2d at 1083.
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982). Administrative rules must be reasonably related
to the purpose of the agency's enabling legislation. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). Regulations will be invalidated by a reviewing court if they
are determined to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); In re Permanent Surface Mining Reg. Litig., 653 F.2d
514, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981). See also Herweg v. Ray, 455
U.S. 265, 275 (1982) (reviewing courts have the authority to determine whether an
agency's regulations are arbitrary).
53. 727 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. The Wyoming Hospital Association brought suit on behalf of its institutional
members, and was joined by twenty-two individual hospitals. Id. at 938.
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evant to regulations issued under the "Hill-Burton" hospital construc-
tion assistance program. 5 5 Hill-Burton assists in the "construction and
modernization of such public or other non-profit community hospitals
. . .as may be necessary. . . to furnish adequate hospital. . . services
to all . . .people."' 56 A prerequisite to obtaining aid under the Act is
the submission to the Surgeon General of a state plan furthering the
Act's purposes.
5 7
Two assurances are required of such a state plan. First, a "commu-
nity service assurance" must guarantee medical treatment to all persons
residing in the territorial area of the hospital.5 8 Second, an "uncompen-
sated care assurance" requires that a reasonable volume of medical serv-
ices be given to persons unable to pay for services.
59
Subpart F of the disputed regulations deleted a prior presumption
of compliance with the volume of care provision where the hospital
adopted an "open door" policy. 60 Under the open door policy, the hos-
pital was not held to a minimum service requirement if it certified that it
would treat any person regardless of his ability to pay. 6 1 The new regu-
lations require hospitals to provide a minimum percentage of uncom-
pensated care 62 in order for states to obtain federal assistance under
Hill-Burton. 6 3 Plaintiffs had elected to comply under the previous
"open door" policy and thus appealed these changes. Plaintiffs argued
that the new regulations exceeded the Secretary's statutory authority.
64
The Tenth Circuit applied the "rational basis" standard, 6 5 and
found that the contested regulations had a rational basis and thus were
within the Secretary's delegated authority. 66 Under Hill-Burton,6 7 the
Secretary has broad authority to promulgate general regulations which
extend to regulation of community service assurances and uncompen-
sated care assurances. 68 The new regulations attempted to develop
more specific standards ensuring that hospitals provide a reasonable
volume of uncompensated care. The regulations promoted certainty in
compliance and fairness; hence, the court held that they were rationally
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1982).
56. Id. § 291(a) (1982).
57. Id. §§ 291c, 291d (1982).
58. 727 F.2d at 938.
59. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982).
60. See Wyoming Hosp. Ass 'n, 727 F.2d at 938.
61. Id.
62. The minimum percentage must be either a level of three percent of its operating
costs or a level often percent of the amount of the federal assistance. See 42 C.F.R. § 124,
subpart F (1980).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-I (1982).
64. 727 F.2d at 938-39.
65. Id. at 939 (citing American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.
1983), appeal pending ; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976)). To be upheld by a reviewing court, administrative regulations must be both
within the agency's authority as delegated by the enabling statute, and must be reasonably
related to the purpose of the statute. See supra note 52.
66. 727 F.2d at 940. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-I (1982).
68. 727 F.2d at 939.
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related to the purpose of originating legislation and were a valid exer-
cise of the Secretary's discretion.
6 9
B. Rulemaking vs. Adjudication
One of the most interesting cases decided recently by the Tenth
Circuit held that an agency abused its discretion by attempting to pro-
pose legislative policy by means of an adjudicative order. In First Bancor-
poration v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 7 0 the Board had
approved plaintiff's application concerning acquisition of Beehive Fi-
nancial Corporation subject to two conditions. First, Beehive could not
offer both negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and com-
mercial loans. Allegedly, performance of both functions made Beehive a
bank rather than an industrial loan company under the Bank Holding
Company Act. 7 1 Second, if Beehive offered NOW accounts instead of
commercial loans, these accounts would be subject to Board regulations
governing reserves and interest limitations. 72 In addition, the Board or-
dered that plaintiff's industrial loan company, Foothill Thrift & Loan
Co., conform to these conditions. 73 An unrelated company subse-
quently acquired Beehive, and plaintiff appealed the Board's order con-
cerning Foothill.
The Tenth Circuit set aside this order on the ground that it was, in
effect, an announcement of a significant policy change. 74 As such, it was
not adjudication but rather substantive rulemaking subject to the
rulemaking provisions of the APA.7 5 Though the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication normally lies within agency discretion,
76
"there may be situations where the agency's reliance on adjudication
69. Id.
70. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 435. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
72. 728 F.2d at 435.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 437.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Administrative action under the Administrative Procedure
Act is classified as either rulemaking or adjudication. Association of Nat'l Advertisers v.
FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Rulemaking
can be described as the promulgation of new policy which governs future conduct, while
adjudication involves the application of such policy to the facts of a particular case; how-
ever, such a distinction may be difficult to draw in actual practice. Id. at 1165 (citing
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973)). "Rules" are character-
ized under the APA in accordance with their effect on the public. Herron v. Heckler, 576
F. Supp. 218, 230 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Substantive rules have a substantive impact on the
rights and duties of the person subject to regulation. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,
564 F.2d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978)).
76. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to specifically require that new agency
policy should be formulated through rulemaking rather than adjudication and has left this
choice within the agency's discretion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947);
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (1974). The recent judicial trend, however, has been to favor rulemaking over adjudi-
cation for the formulation of new policy. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE,
§ 7:25 (Supp. 1982). This trend is particularly pronounced in the Ninth Circuit, but the
future of this trend remains in doubt. For a rare "ghost" opinion dealing with this issue,
see Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981).
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would amount to an abuse of discretion .... ..77 The court pointed to
the Board's instructions issued to other bank holding companies which
stated that Board policy toward NOW accounts was determined in its
order to plaintiff. This led the court to conclude that the Board's order
was simply a vehicle by which to change general policy. The court
stated: "That the Board's order is an attempt to construct policy by ad-
judication is evident. . . . We must conclude that the Board abused its
discretion by improperly attempting to propose legislative policy by an
adjudicative order.''78
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's
argument that its order was an interpretative rule and therefore exempt
from the rulemaking provisions of the APA. 79 The court stated that an
interpretative rule is a mere clarification or explanation of an existing
statute or regulation,8 0 whereas the Board's order announced a signifi-
cant policy change. Thus, the order was a substantive rule subject to
APA rulemaking provisions. 8 ' Since these provisions were not com-
plied with, the Tenth Circuit set aside the Board's order.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION: REVIEW OF AGENCY FACT-FINDING
The APA provides for judicial review of administrative findings of
fact under the "substantial evidence" test.8 2 The test requires only that
there be enough evidence in the record, viewed as a whole, that a rea-
sonable person could have reached the same conclusion as the agency.
The substantial evidence test is most often applied during review of ad-
ministrative proceedings involving a formal trial-type hearing. By its
very nature, the substantial evidence test is highly deferential towards
77. 728 F.2d at 437 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
See also Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Cox, 592 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding
that approval of rates for the future constitutes rulemaking, not adjudication, for purposes
of application of APA sections); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC,
725 F.2d 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that trial-like procedures are particularly appro-
priate for retroactive determination of specific facts about individual parties, and, in cer-
tain cases, due process may even require such procedures); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that any claim of exemption from
APA rulemaking requirements will be narrowly construed and only reluctantly counte-
nanced); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. 728 F.2d at 438 (citations omitted).
79. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) (1982).
80. 728 F.2d at 438 (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins.
Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Interpretative rules are clarifications or expla-
nations of existing laws or regulations. Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194,
197 (D. Del. 1970). APA rulemaking procedures are not applicable to interpretative rules.
Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Production Tool Corp. v. Employ-
ment & Training Admin., 688 F.2d 1161, 1165-6 (7th Cir. 1982). However, substantive
rules create rather than interpret law. New Jersey v. Dept. of HHS, 670 F.2d 1262, 1282
(3d Cir. 1981). Substantive rules affect existing rights and obligations. Lewis-Mota v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, substantive rules are subject to
the APA's rulemaking procedures. Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209
(9th Cir. 1982).
81. 728 F.2d at 438.
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (defining the "substantial evidence" test as "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.").
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the administrative decision. Although the agency must base its decision
on something more than a "mere scintilla," the reviewing court can usu-
ally find this minimal quantum of evidence upon reviewing the record as
a whole. The presence or absence of "substantial evidence" was a key
factor in several cases recently decided by the court of appeals. Not sur-
prisingly, out of the seven cases in which the Tenth Circuit applied the
substantial evidence test,8 3 only one was remanded to the agency for
lack of substantial evidence.
84
In Winn v. Schweiker,85 the Tenth Circuit held that the record did not
support a decision by the Department of Health and Human Services to
terminate plaintiff's disability insurance benefits under the Social Secur-
ity Act. 8 6 The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Winn had
supervisory experience which was transferable; however, the record was
contradictory as to such experience and totally lacking as to details.
87
The case was remanded for reconsideration and development of a more
complete record on this factual issue.
88
IV. JURISDICTION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
There exist a number of self-imposed restraints onjudical review of
agency action which allow courts to refuse to consider the merits of a
case. Chief among these threshold questions is the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of remedy. In Romero-Carmona v. Department of Justice,8 9 the Tenth
Circuit held the case nonjusticiable because the petitioner failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies.90 Romero-Carmona sought review of
a denial of a stay of deportation by a district director of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS). An immigration judge originally
found petitioner to be deportable on August 25, 1978, following three
separate illegal entries into the United States. The judge granted peti-
tioner's request for voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. Peti-
tioner waived his right to appeal the immigration judge's decision but
failed to return to Mexico, ignoring a subsequent deportation order.
Petitioner was then arrested on February 18, 1983, and again agreed to
return to Mexico. Petitioner failed to return and instead requested a
83. The six cases affirming the agency decision included: Wyoming Bancorporation
v. Board of Governors, 729 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1984); Murdock v. Schweiker, No. 82-1849
(10th Cir. Jan. 6, 1984); Turner Bros. Trucking v. ICC, 709 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1983);
Ringer v. Helms, No. 82-1190 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1983); Manzanaves v. Heckler, No. 83-
1223 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1983); Hall v. Heckler, No. 82-2578 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1983).
84. Winn v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1983).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 946.
87. Id. at 948.
88. Id. at 949.
89. 725 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 105-6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1982) (which provides: "An order of depor-
tation. . . shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administra-
tive remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations
.. .
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stay of deportation.9 '
The Tenth Circuit held that a denial of a stay of deportation can be
reviewed only if the deportability issue is reviewable at the same time.
9 2
Because Romero-Carmona did not contest the original finding of de-
portability or preserve his right to appeal that decision, he failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies.93 Petitioner also failed to timely
appeal the deportation order of August 25, 1978.9 4 The court found
that the issue of petitioner's deportability was not reviewable and dis-
missed the petition for review. I"
As a result of the exhaustion doctrine, the court of appeals also
failed to reach the merits in Bartlett v. Schweiker.9 5 In this case, recipients
of social security benefits brought suit in federal district court, claiming
that they were totally disabled under the Social Security Act's definitions
and that their benefits were wrongfully denied or terminated.9 6 District
court jurisdiction to review a denial of social security benefits by the
Secretary is statutory, permitting an individual to seek judicial review
within sixty days after receiving notice of a Secretary's "final decision"
following a hearing.
9 7
The Supreme Court has held that this "final decision" requirement
is "central to the grant of subject matter jurisdiction,"-9 8 and consists of
two elements.9 9 One is waivable and the other is not. "The waivable
element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed
by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the require-
ment that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secre-
tary."10 0 The exhaustion requirement can be waived by the Secretary if
further review is unwarranted due to fulfillment of the agency's internal
needs or if the relief sought is beyond the Secretary's power.' 0 ' A
waiver of the exhaustion requirement may also be found by a reviewing
court if a constitutional claim is wholly collateral to the substantive claim
of entitlement, and if plaintiff can show irreparable injury not compensa-
ble by retroactive payments.' 0 2 None of these arguments were success-
91. 725 F.2d at 104-05.
92. Id. at 105 (citing Reyes v. INS, 571 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1978)). The rationale
for this rule is that review of the denial of a stay of deportation is ancillary to the de-
portability issue, and therefore both determinations should be made at the same time.
Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 227 (1963). See also Antolos v. INS, 402 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir.
1968).
93. 725 F.2d at 105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1982).
94. 725 F.2d at 105. See 8 U.S.C. § 105a(a)(l) (1982).
95. 719 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 1060.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1982).
98. Bartlett, 719 F.2d at 1060 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975)).
99. Bartlett, 719 F.2d at 1061.
100. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)).
101. 719 F.2d at 1061 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330; Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975)).
102. 719 F.2d at 1061 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-31 & n.l 1; Franks v.
Nimmo, 683 F.2d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 1982); New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 850 (10th Cir. 1982); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121,
1125 (10th Cir. 1973)).
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fully advanced by the plaintiffs. The court held that waiver of the
exhaustion requirement was not justified and affirmed dismissal of the
case for failure to meet this requirement.'
0 3
B. Timeliness
In Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 10 4 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Quivira Mining
and other energy-related companies challenged an Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) regulation establishing standards for permissible
doses of radiation released from uranium fuel cycle operations.
10 5
Plaintiffs claimed that EPA lacked the authority to promulgate the regu-
lation. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was
invalid and an injunction against its enforcement.
106
The district court dismissed this action, concluding that the Atomic
Energy Act 10 7 "referred all appeals of such proceedings directly to the
Court of Appeals under the Hobbs Act."' 108 The Tenth Circuit also dis-
missed the action, concluding that the Presidential Reorganization Plan
of 1 9 7 0 ,109 which transferred regulatory authority over environmental
standards regarding radioactive materials from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) to the EPA, did not alter the original exclusive review
provisions for AEC rulemaking.110 Plaintiffs therefore had long since
missed, under the Hobbs Act," i I the deadline for appellate review of the
challenged regulations 112 and thus were denied review. 113
In White v. Schweiker, 114 the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff sought review
of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of her claim for sur-
vivor's benefits.' 15 White was originally awarded benefits effective as of
April 1974 and requested reconsideration on the ground that benefits
should have been effective from 1970. Plaintiff did not file a request for
a hearing within the sixty-day time limit, but waited two years before
making the request. Nevertheless, the ALJ granted the request and af-
firmed the original award. Plaintiff then sought review of the ALJ's deci-
sion by the Appeals Council, which dismissed the case for lack of good
cause for late filing of hearing request.' 16
The Tenth Circuit concluded that a decision of the SSA not to reo-
103. 719 F.2d at 1061-63.
104. 728 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 478. See 40 C.F.R. Part 190.10(a) (1983).
106. 728 F.2d at 478.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
108. 728 F.2d at 478. The pertinent provision of the Hobbs Act is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342 (1982).
109. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1982). See 40 C.F.R. § 190 (1984).
110. 728 F.2d at 481.
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1982).
112. 728 F.2d at 484.
113. Id.
114. 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 92. Judicial review was sought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
116. 725 F.2d at 92-93.
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pen a claim is unreviewable, whether or not the SSA held a hearing on
whether good cause for the late filing was shown. 1 7 The Court also
held that the Appeals Council may substitute its judgment for that of the
ALJ on any matter committed to the absolute discretion of the SSA," 1
8
and the federal courts have no jurisdiction to review such an action.' 19
V. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON AGENCY ACTION
A. Procedural Due Process
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process remains
a viable source of limitation on agency action. In Allison v. Heckler,120 the
Tenth Circuit held that an ALJ's use of a post-hearing medical report
constituted a denial of Allison's due process rights. Allison sought re-
view of an ALJ's denial of Social Security benefits. 12 1 In reversing this
decision, the Tenth Circuit, per Judge Seymour, stated that the ALJ
erred in adopting a doctor's conclusions made upon post-hearing review
of Allison's medical records. When these medical conclusions became
the basis of the ALJ's finding of non-disability, plaintiWs right to "a full
and fair hearing" was abrogated.' 2 2 The Court remanded the case with
instructions to provide plaintiff an opportunity to subpoena and cross-
examine the doctor, and to offer rebuttal evidence.
12 3
The Tenth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff was entitled to
a hearing in City of Colorado Springs v. United States.12 4 The City sought
review of an ICC order authorizing the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
Company (D & RGW) to raise its rates based on the filing of tariffs on
intrastate freight. Early in 1980, several Colorado railroads, including
the D & RGW, had sought permission from the Public Utilities Commis-
sion (PUC) to implement a four percent general rate increase on Colo-
rado intrastate traffic. Colorado Springs protested this increase and
PUC rejected the increase. The Colorado railroads then petitioned the
117. Id. at 93 (citing Davis v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1982); Giacone v.
Schweiker, 656 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1981); Rios v. Secretary of HEW, 614 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1980); Hensley v. Califano, 601 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1979); Carney v. Califano, 598 F.2d 472
(8th Cir. 1979); Teague v. Califano, 560 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1977)).
118. 725 F.2d at 94.
119. Id. The Court had no jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's action under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1984).
Plaintiff also argued that the Appeals Council violated her due process rights because
it did not notify her that it would reconsider the ALJ's good cause finding. The court
rejected this constitutional claim, stating:
It would be good practice for the Appeals Council to notify a claimant that it
is considering reopening the good cause issue-a practice it apparently now fol-
lows-but we cannot say the Due Process Clause requires that a claimant be noti-
fied and be given a chance to reargue the good cause issue before the Appeals
Council.
725 F.2d at 94 (citing generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976)).
120. 711 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 146.
122. Id. at 147 (citing Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 737 (11 th Cir. 1981); Gullo v.
Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1979); Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712, 714
(7th Cir. 1976)).
123. 711 F.2d at 147-48.
124. 724 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1983).
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ICC, requesting that the PUC's rejection of their proposed rate increase
be vacated.1 2 5 Shortly afterwards, Congress enacted the Staggers Motor
Carrier Act of 1980.126 Prior to this enactment, the railroads' intrastate
transportation services and rates were subject to state regulation under
ICC review. The Staggers Act, however, abrogated most state jurisdic-
tion over intrastate rates.
127
An ICC ALJ accordingly ruled that the Staggers Act nullified the
Colorado PUC order, leaving the railroads free to implement their in-
crease.' 2 8 The ICC Review Board affirmed this decison. 129 The Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded to the ICC,' 30 holding that a retroactive
application of the Staggers Act to all legal issues obviated the right of
Colorado Springs to a hearing. To deny such a hearing constituted a
denial of due process.'
3 '
B. Punitive Sanctions
In United States v. Sheshtawy, 13 2 the Tenth Circuit clarified the limita-
tion on the goverment's authority to revoke citizenship as a punitive
sanction. In this case, the district court revoked plaintiff's citizenship
and cancelled his certificate of naturalization because he failed to dis-
close a prior arrest on his naturalization questionnaire.13 3 In reversing,
the Tenth Circuit, per Judge McKay, relied on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Chaunt v. United States,' 3 4 ihich defined the heavy burden of
proof the government carries when it attempts to revoke citizenship for
the willful misrepresentation or concealment of material fact. 135 In or-
der to demonstrate that a given fact is "material," the government must
125. Id. at 858-59.
126. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1913 (1980).
127. The purpose of the Staggers Act is "to ensure the development, coordination, and
preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation needs of the United
States" and in pursuit of this goal, "to encourage the establishment and maintenance of
reasonable rates for transportation without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or de-
structive competitive practices." 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(4) (1982). To achieve its objec-
tives, this Act gave the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over transportation
by rail carrier, as well as other forms of transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1982). For
more complete discussion of the Staggers Act and its effect on interstate transportation,
see Birkholz, The Staggers Act of 1980, Deregulations and Rereguation: A Railroad Perspective, 17
FORUM 850 (1982); Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion - Never the Twain
Shall Meet: The Motor Carier Act of 1980, 58 CHI. KENr L. REV. 1 (1981); Kretsinger, The
Motor Carrier Act of 1980: Report and Analysis, 50 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 21 (1981).
128. 724 F.2d at 859.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 860.
131. Id. The court stated:
Inasmuch as the Commission took it upon itself to apply the Staggers Act (the
parties operated under the assumption that the Staggers Act did not apply), and
considering that the Commission's decision caused Colorado Springs to lose its
right to a hearing under pre-Staggers Act law, we think it constituted manifest
injustice for the Commission to deny Colorado Springs a hearing.
Id. at 860 (citing Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
132. 714 F.2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 1039.
134. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
135. Id. at 353.
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"show by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence either (1) that
facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of
citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an in-
vestigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship."'136 Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion to
Fedorenko v. United States, 137 concluded that the Chaunt test requires that
the government demonstrate the existence of actual disqualifying facts
which would themselves warrant denial of petitioner's citizenship.
138
The Tenth Circuit adopted Justice Blackmun's interpretation of
Chaunt and outlined a balancing test which weighs the "importance of
securing the stability and security of naturalized citizenship against the
risk. . . of encouraging lying in connection with applications for citizen-
ship."' 3 9 The court concluded that in this case the danger of unwar-
ranted revocation of naturalized citizenship far outweighs the danger of
dishonesty. Serious cases of misrepresentation would still be punishable
under the Chaunt test,14 0 but since the government had not established
facts warranting denial of plaintiffs citizenship, the court concluded that
revocation under section 1451(a) was not justified.' 
4 '
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government's alternative argu-
ment that revocation was justified because the plaintiff failed to meet all
of the statutory prerequisites to naturalization. 142 The government con-
tended that plaintiff, as a liar, was not of good moral character and
therefore ineligible for citizenship.14 3 The court held that such ineligi-
bility can only result from false testimony concerning material facts,
14 4
and that plaintiff's statements were not made in regard to any material
facts. The Tenth Circuit reinstated plaintiff's citizenship.'
45
SusanJ. Tyburski
136. Id. at 355.
137. 449 U.S. 490, 518-26 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 524.
139. 714 F.2d at 1040.
140. Id. at 1040-41.
141. Id. at 1041. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
142. 714 F.2d at 1041.
143. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(6), 1427(a)(3) (1976).
144. 714 F.2d at 1041 (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507 (1981)).
145. Id. Judge McWilliams dissented, arguing that if Sheshtawy had answered the
questionnaire truthfully, the authorities may have started an investigation "possibly eading
to other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id. at 1042 (emphasis in original). With-
out explanation, Judge McWilliams asserted that this meets the second test in Chaunt. Id.
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